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Abstract: Many types of system operate for missions which are made up of several phases. For the 
complete mission to be a success, the system must operate successfully during each of the phases. 
Examples of such systems include an aircraft flight, and also many military operations for both aircraft 
and ships. An aircraft mission could be considered as the following phases: taxiing to the runway, take-
off, climbing to the correct altitude, cruising, descending, landing and taxiing back to the terminal. 
Component failures can occur at any point during the mission but their condition may only be critical 
for one particular phase. As such it may be that the transition from one phase to another is the critical 
event leading to mission failure, the component failures resulting in the system failure may have 
occurred during some previous phase. 
 
This paper describes a means of analysing the reliability of non-repairable systems which undergo 
phased missions. Fault Tree Analysis has been used as the method to assess the system performance. 
The results of the analysis are the system failure modes in each phase (minimal cut sets), the failure 
probability in each phase and the total mission unreliability. To increase the efficiency of the analysis 
the fault trees constructed to represent the system failure logic are analysed using a modularisation 
method. Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD’s) are then employed to quantify the likelihood of failure in 
each phase. 
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1 Introduction 
 
If the success of a mission is reliant upon a set of objectives operating over different time intervals, it 
may be referred to as a Phased Mission. During the execution of the phases in a mission, the system is 
altered such that the logic model, system configuration, or system failure characteristics may change to 
accomplish a different objective. The phases in a mission may be expressed in terms of: phase number, 
time interval, system configuration, task(s) to be undertaken, performance measure(s) of interest, and 
maintenance policy. This type of mission can be characterized as a sequence of discrete events required 
to complete a task e.g. an aircraft flight phase pattern. 
 
In order to identify possible causes of phase and mission failure, a method is required to express how 
combinations of component failures (basic events) can occur during the phases throughout the mission 
and cause system failure. These failure events then require quantification to enable the likelihood and 
frequency of mission failure to be determined. 
 
 The main techniques that have previously been implemented for the solution to phased mission 
problems are that of Fault Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis and Simulation. The technique of fault tree 
analysis (FTA) is a commonly used tool to assess the probability of failure of industrial systems. This 
method may be adapted for analysis of systems comprising of more than one phase, where each phase 
depends on a different logic model. Hence the complexity of the modelling is significantly more 
difficult than for single phase systems. The fault tree approach represents the failure logic of the system 
in an inverted tree structure, and allows for both qualitative and quantitative system reliability analysis 
to take place. The earliest inspection of the analysis of phased missions was that carried out by Esary 
and Ziehms [1]. This research employed a fault tree method by which the mission is split into 
consecutive phases whereby each phase performs a specified task. The success of the mission depends 
on the performance of the non-repairable components used in each phase. The probability of this 
success is referred to as the Mission Reliability. Mission unreliability is defined as the probability that 
the system fails to function successfully during at least one phase of the mission. An important problem 
is to calculate, as efficiently as possible, either the exact value or bounds for the mission unreliability 
parameter. Methods to obtain estimates of such bounds are discussed by Burdick et al [2]. 
 
Situations may be encountered in phased mission analysis that prevent the assumption of independence 
between component failure or repair being made. In such circumstances, methods other than fault tree 
analysis must be applied. One such technique is the Markov approach [3]. The reliability of a mission 
may not be obtained by the simple multiplication of the individual phase reliabilities. This is due to the 
fact that at the phase change times, the system must occupy a state that allows both of the involved 
phases to function. The phases of the mission will be statistically dependent and an approach for 
solution has been presented by Smotherman and  Zemoudeh[4] for repairable components. Of the many 
considered solutions to phased mission problems, simulation techniques typically offer the greatest 
generality in representation, but are also often the most expensive in computational requirements. The 
Markov method offers a combination of flexibility in representation and ease of solution but requires 
transition rates to be independent of time[5], and suffers from a potential explosion in the number of 
state equations for even moderate sized problems.  
 
In some situations, it will be difficult to model a system by fault tree or Markov methods. This type of 
situation will occur if a system is too complex to use deterministic analysis, or if the failure and repair 
distributions of a component may not have a constant failure or repair rate. In such circumstances, 
simulation may be necessary. 
 
Previous work has concentrated on assessing mission success. This paper identifies the probability of 
failure in each phase. Depending on the phase that the failure occurs, the consequences can be 
significantly different. Having calculated the probability of  failure in each phase, the mission 
unreliability is simply the sum of the phase failure probabilities. In reducing the complexity of the 
problem in this way, the efficiency of the approach is improved. Further improvement can be achieved 
by employing modularisation methods and the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) method. Focus will be 
restricted to a system where components are non-repairable.  
 
  
2 Previous Fault Tree Methods for Phased Missions 
 
 
A very simple phased mission problem consisting of non-repairable components with A, B and C 
representing component failures in each of the phases may be used to demonstrate approaches to 
phased misison analysis (Figure. 1). 
 
The simple system will enable the features of the approaches to be understood without complicated 
analysis. During phase 1 which lasts until time t1 the success of the mission is dependent upon all of the 
three components A, B, and C.  Successful completion of phase 1 means the system then enters phase 2 
which requires component A to function between times t1 and t2, along with at least one of the 
remaining two components B and C. The final phase requires that only one out of the three components 
must function between t2 and t3 for the mission to be accomplished successfully. 
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Figure 1 Reliability Network of a Simple Phased Mission System 
 
Considering the phases as separate systems, the fault trees to represent individual phase failure are as 
shown in Figure 2. The notation used to represent component failure in phase i is A B Ci i i, ,  for 
components A, B and C respectively. 
Failure in Phase 1
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Figure 2 Fault Tree Representation of Individual Phase Failures 
 
 The minimal cut sets for each phase when treated as separate systems are: 
 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3  
        A       A     A B C 
        B          B C 
         C     
    
The method of calculating the reliability of a phased mission cannot simply be obtained by the 
multiplication of the reliabilities of each of the individual phases as this involves the false assumptions 
that the phases are independent and all components are in the working state at the beginning of each 
phase, and results in an appreciable over-prediction of system reliability. 
 
A method proposed by Esary and Ziehms [1] involves the transformation of a multi-phase mission to 
that of an equivalent single phase mission. This transformation process involves three stages and is only 
concerned with the failure of the mission. It does not account for the phase in which failure occurs. 
Having expressed the failure causes for each phase by separate fault trees as in Figure 2, the 
transformation to single phased mission is achieved by: 
  
1.  Elimination of unnecessary cut sets. If cut sets of an earlier phase contain any from a later phase 
they may be removed from the first. 
  
       For example if the minimal cut sets for each phase in the mission are: 
 
    Phase 1    Phase 2 
         AB        A 
       CDE         CF 
 
then minimal cut set AB can be removed from phase 1 as A failing in phase 1 means it will still be 
failed in phase 2 which will fail the mission. This makes the status of component B irrelevant. 
 
In the problem shown in figure 2 it means that minimal cut set A can be removed from phase 1. 
 
2. Component failure events in each phase fault tree are replaced by an OR combination of the failure 
events for that and all preceding phases. For example, component A failure in phase 2 would be 
represented by the OR of the failure of the component in phase 1 (A1) and in phase 2 (A2) since the 
component is non-repairable (see Figure. 3). [Note the replacement is only performed on phase fault 
trees which have the eliminated minimal cut sets removed]. 
 
Failure of
component A in
Phase 2
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Figure. 3 Replacement OR combination 
  
3.  Each phase failure is combined using an OR gate to represent overall mission failure (i.e. the event 
that any phase does not complete successfully). This transforms the original multi-phase mission 
into an equivalent single phase mission as shown in Figure. 4. 
 
Failure in Phase 1
B1 C1
A2
Failure in Phase 2 Failure in Phase 3
Mission Failure
A1
B2B1 C2C1
A3A1 A2 B3B1 B2 C3C1 C2
 
Figure. 4 Equivalent single phase mission 
 
This equivalent single phase mission (see Figure. 4) produces different minimal cut sets than would 
have resulted from the combination of the individual phase minimal cut sets.
 
The process of removing cuts sets prior to the construction of fault trees can generally be seen to 
produce a simpler failure diagram and problem for analysis. However, since cuts sets are removed to 
produce this single phase mission, it becomes impossible to calculate individual phase failure 
probabilities which would be desirable. 
 
3 Proposed Fault Tree Method for Phased Missions 
 
 
A new method is proposed which enhances the fault tree approach in the previous section. It will enable 
the probability of failure in each phase to be determined in addition to the whole mission unreliability. 
For any phase, the method combines the causes of success of previous phases with the causes of failure 
for the phase being considered to allow both qualitative and quantitative analysis of both phase failure 
and mission failure.  
 
The event of component failure in phase i is again represented as the event that the component could 
have failed during any phase up to and including phase i. System failure in phase i is represented by the 
AND of the success of phases 1..i-1 and the failure during phase i. (Figure. 5) 
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 Figure. 5 Generalised Phase Failure Fault Tree
 
 
Mission unreliability, QMISS , is then obtained from  
Q QMISS i
i
n
=
=
∑
1
                       (1) 
 
where Qi  is the failure probability in phase i and n is the total number of phases.                                                                   
          
This method allows for the evaluation of individual phase failures, and also accounts for the condition 
where components are known to have functioned to enable the system to function in previous phases. 
However, due to the fact that cut sets are not removed until a later stage in the analysis, the fault tree 
can be much more complex and require significantly more effort to solve. 
 
The failure of a system may occur in many different ways. Each unique way is referred to as a system 
failure mode, and involves the failure of either a single component, or the combination of failures of 
multiple components. To determine the minimal cut sets of a phase or mission, either a top-down or a 
bottom-up approach is applied to the relevant fault tree. For any phases after the first phase, the 
incorporation of the success of previous phases means that the fault tree will be non-coherent and not 
simply consist of AND and OR gates. NOT logic will be required to represent this success, and the 
combinations of basic events that lead to the occurrence of the top event are referred to as Prime 
Implicants. 
 
This proposed method may be applied for the simple three-phase mission given in Figure 1. The fault 
tree to represent the initial phase failure of the mission remains identical to the fault tree representation 
of the individual phase failure of phase 1 shown in Figure 2. Phase 2 failure can then be shown as the 
combination of phase 1 success and failure in phase 2 (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 Phase 2 Failure Fault Tree 
 
Similarly, phase 3 failure can be represented as the combination of phase 1 and phase 2 successes, and 
failure in phase 3 (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7 Phase 3 Failure Fault Tree 
 
 
3.1 Fault Tree Modularisation 
 
 
Fault tree modularisation techniques are helpful to reduce the size of a fault tree to enable prime 
implicants to be found more efficiently. These modularisation techniques reduce both memory and time 
requirements. A non-coherent extension of a modularisation technique developed by Riso [6] has been 
 employed in this work. It repeatedly applies the stages of contraction, factorisation and extraction to 
reduce the complexity of the fault tree diagram. The phases are identified as: 
 
• Contraction 
 
Subsequent gates of the same type are contracted to form a single gate. The resulting tree structure is 
then an alternating sequence of OR and AND gates. 
 
• Factorisation 
 
Identification of basic events that always occur together in the same gate type. The combination of 
events and gate type is replaced by a complex event. However, since NOT logic is included in order to 
combine phase success and failure means that in this stage, the primary basic events that are found to 
always occur together in one gate type must have complements that always occur together in the 
opposite gate type by De Morgans’s laws, e.g. 
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• Extraction 
 
Searches for structures within the tree of the form shown in Figure 8 that may be simplified by 
extracting an event to a higher level. 
 
A B A C
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B C
A B A C
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Figure 8 Extraction Stage of the Modularisation Technique 
 
 
 3.2 Prime Implicants in Phased Mission Systems 
 
 
Due to the non-coherent nature of the fault trees, the combinations of basic events that lead to the 
occurrence of the top event of any phase failure are expressed as prime implicants. The notation used to 
represent the failure of component A in phase i is Ai . Ai represents the functioning of component A 
throughout phase i. The notation used to indicate the failure of a component in phase i to j is Aij , i.e. 
fails at some time from the start of phase i to the end of phase j. 
 
This notation enables us to define a new algebra over the phases to manipulate the logic equations. 
What is of concern in later phases is the time duration (i.e. phases) during which the component failures 
occur. So if we produce a combination of events for component A: 
 
  )( 4321 AAAA +     
 
it means we will only produce the top event being developed if A fails in phases 3 or 4 i.e. A34  where, 
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 f tA ( ) is the density function of failure times for component A 
 
 
 
A summary of the new algebraic laws are: 
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Therefore if two implicant sets contain exactly the same components where all but one of which occur 
over the same time intervals and the other is a failure in contiguous phases, the two implicant sets may 
be combined with the period of failure for the component with time discrepancy adjusted, eg: 
 
  
A B
A B
1 1
1 2
                                               
A B1 12  
 
 As the components are non-repairable, the event of component failure will only be possible over 
contiguous phases. This simplification approach therefore allows the prime implicants for the simple 
example given in Figure 1 to be expressed as: 
 
Phase 1 
 
  T A B C1 1 1 1= + +  
 
Minimal Cut Sets: 
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Phase 2 
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  Prime Implicants: A B C
A B C
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Phase 3 
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  Prime Implicants: A B C
A B C
3 3 23
3 23 3
 
 
 
3.3 Quantification 
 
 
Having established the prime implicants for each phase they may now be used to quantify the 
probability of phase and mission failure.  
 
 
The unreliability, Qi  ,for each individual phase i is found using a simple inclusion-exclusion expansion 
for the prime implicants C j in the phase,  
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Therefore the event of phase failure for this simple three-phase mission may be expressed as: 
 
  Phase 1: Q q q q q q q q q q q q qA B C A B A C B C A B C1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1= + + − − − +  
 
  Phase 2: Q q q q q q q q q qA B C A B C A B C2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 21 1 1= − − + − −( )( ) ( )         (3) 
 
  Phase 3: Q q q q q q q q q qA B C A B C A B C3 3 3 23 3 23 3 3 3 3= + −  
 
As the failure of each of the phases produce mutually exclusive causes, the probability of mission 
failure may be expressed as a sum of the unreliabilities of the individual phases: 
 
      Q QMISS i
i
n
=
=
∑
1
                      (4)         
 
For systems with non-repairable components, the expected number of failures per mission is equal to 
the mission unreliability.                                        
 
4 Binary Decision Diagram Analysis for Phased Missions 
 
A Fault Tree Structure is very efficient to represent system failure logic, however is not an ideal form 
for mathematical analysis. Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) represent a logic expression and offer 
efficient mathematical manipulation, although it is very difficult to construct directly from the system 
definition. For larger fault trees it is more efficient to convert to a BDD prior to analysis. The approach 
of performing the quantification process after first converting the fault tree to a BDD form offers 
significant advantages for large complex fault trees. This is particularly true of structures which are 
non-coherent, such as the phase failure fault trees. 
 
Figure 9 shows a Binary Decision Diagram. Paths through the BDD start at the top root node and 
terminate at one of two terminal nodes, 1 or 0. A terminal one indicates top event occurrence and 
terminal zero is top event non-occurrence. 
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Figure 9 Binary Decision Diagram 
 
 Each node on the diagram corresponds to a basic event in the fault tree which has to be placed in an 
ordering prior to BDD construction. In this case the ordering is A<B<C.  
 
All nodes have two out branches, a 1 branch corresponds to component failure and a 0 branch 
corresponds to a component working state. 
 
Prime implicants are given by events on paths through the diagram which lead to a terminal 1 vertex, 
i.e., 
 
AB
ABC
 
 
In this case, by consensus these can be reduced to minimal cut sets: 
 
AB
AC
 
 
since this BDD does not represent a non-coherent system. More details of qualitative BDD analysis can 
be found in reference [7]. 
 
4.1 Construction 
 
A binary decision diagram consists of vertexes where each vertex has an if-then-else structure as shown 
in Figure 10. 
 
X1
f1 f2
1 0
 
 
Figure 10 A Binary Decision Diagram Vertex 
 
This if-then-else structure is represented in shorthand (ite) notation as  
 
ite(X1, f1, f2) 
 
To combine two basic events using a logical operation ⊕ ,  
 
),,(
),,(
2g1gYiteHand
2f1fXiteJIf
=
=
 
      
  
If(X1) then 
 Consider function f1 
else 
 Consider function f2 
endif 
 If X < Y   ),,( H2fH1fXiteHJ ⊕⊕=⊕  
                  (5) 
 If X = Y   ),,( 2g2f1g1fXiteHJ ⊕⊕=⊕  
 
The basic events in any BDD are represented as A ite A= ( , , )1 0 and A ite A= ( , , )0 1 . For phased mission 
systems, the BDD is constructed so that each component is considered in each phase (in phase order) 
before the next basic event is taken into account. 
 
 
4.2 Quantification 
 
 
Since each path to a terminal 1 is disjoint then the exact top event probability QEXACT is given by: 
 
∑
=
=
n
i
iEXACT rpQ
1
)(  
 where )( irp  is the probability of the ith disjoint path to  
 
Further details of BDD quantification can be found in reference [8]. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Example  
 
 
The simple three-phase mission illustrated in Figure 1 may be represented in BDD form for each phase 
and then quantified. The fault trees for phase 1 (Figure 2), phase 2 (Figure 6) and phase 3 (Figure 7) are 
first converted to BDDs. These BDDs are shown in Figures 11-13 respectively. Their analysis is 
presented below. 
 
In BDD methodology to evaluate the success of a phase as opposed to the failure, a 1 is replaced by a 0 
and a 0 by a 1 for the terminal nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 Phase 1 
 
For phase 1, the ite structure represented by the BDD in Figure 11 is: 
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Figure 11 Phase 1 Failure BDD 
 
Analysis of this BDD gives 
 
Minimal Cut Sets: 
A
B
C
1
1
1
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Phase 2 
 
The BDD for failure during phase 2 is given by the following ite structure: 
 
ite A ite A ite B ite C ite B ite B ite C ite C( , , ( , ( , , ( , , )), ( , , ( , ( , , ( , , )), ))))1 2 1 1 1 2 1 20 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0  
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Figure 12 Failure During Phase 2 BDD 
 
For each path to a terminal 1, using the algebra of events gives, 
 
Prime Implicants: A A B C
A A B B C C
1 2 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2
   =>     
A B C
A B C
2 1 1
12 2 2
 
 
Nodes on a BDD path will represent failure or functioning of a particular component through different 
phases. These must be combined using the algebra of events given earlier prior to evaluating the 
probability of the status required of that component. 
 
Having considered each component encountered on a path the probability of the path to the terminal 1 
is evaluated as usual by taking the product of the probability of the component status. The phase failure 
is then obtained by summing the probability of each disjoint path. 
  
2221112 CBAACBA2 qqqq1q1q1qQ )())(( −−+−−=  
 
 
 Phase 3 
 
The BDD representation for the fault tree representing failure during phase 3 is: 
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Figure 13 Failure during Phase 3 BDD 
 
 
Prime Implicants: 
A A A B B B C C C
A A A B B B C C
A A A B B C C C
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3
  
A B C
A B C
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A B C
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3 3 23
3 23 3
   
 
Q q q q q q q q q qA B C A B C A B C3 3 3 23 3 23 3 3 3 3= + − . 
 
 
Therefore it can be seen that the unreliability of each of the phases as found by the BDD method is 
identical to that obtained using fault tree analysis (Equation 3). 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
1. The accurate assessment of mission unreliability for systems with non-repairable components 
operating over a sequence of phases can be performed using non-coherent fault tree structures. 
  
2. The direct quantification of the fault trees is frequently problematic for even moderate sized 
problems due to the size and complexity of the resulting logic functions. 
 
3. Fault tree modularisation methods provide some reduction in the size of the problem but not enough 
for this alone to offer a practical solution method. 
 
4. The use of Binary Decision Diagrams (enhanced to account for the phased nature of component 
failures) to calculate the failure probability of each phase in the mission provides an efficient and 
accurate means  of evaluating the mission reliability. 
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